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RESEARCH INVOLVING MINORS – A DUTY OF SOLIDARITY?  
 
ABSTRACT 
Research without direct medical benefit for the participants raises a number 
of difficult ethical issues. In particular, it is controversial whether it is 
ethically justifiable to conduct such research with participants who are unable 
to give informed consent, in particular minors. One attempt to vindicate such 
research is based on the concept of group benefit. According to this concept, 
experiments are justified, even if they do not hold out direct medical benefit 
for the participants, as long as they can be expected to be beneficial for 
members of a group that the research subjects are also members of (e.g. the 
group of minors). In this article, we shall reject the concept of group benefit 
as a means to justify medical research involving minors. Instead, we suggest 
an approach that bears on the concept of solidarity, understood as a principle 
of a moral division of labor that is based on considerations about efficiency 
in discharging ethical requirements. According to this approach, minors can 
be under the obligation to participate in research insofar as they are in a 
privileged position to help overcoming an ethically relevant deficit. This is, 
admittedly, only the case as long as the participation is not excessively 
demanding. In closing, we discuss some possible objections against this 
approach. 
KEY WORDS: research, minors, solidarity, moral division of labor, group 
benefit, consent, autonomy. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since scientific experiments have become the methodical standard in 
medicine during the 19th century, the question whether or under which 
conditions research involving humans can be ethically justified has been 
subject to controversial debate. One of the most important principles to justify 
research on humans is the principle of informed consent: According to this 
principle, potential research subjects must be informed about all relevant 
aspects of an experiment in advance. On this basis, they can decide for or 
against participating in the experiment. An autonomous decision in favor of 
participation constitutes a strong element in the process of ethical 
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justification. However, it is widely acknowledged that some further 
conditions must be met. The experiment must, for example, not lead to severe 
damage to the psychophysical integrity of the research subjects; the 
foreseeable risks must be adequate when weighted against the expected 
scientific gains; and the recruitment of the research subjects must meet 
requirements of justice.  
The recruitment of adult research subjects who are able to make an 
autonomous decision is generally regarded as ethically acceptable. For two 
reasons, the case of research involving minors is far more complicated. First, 
the principle of informed consent is not or at least not fully applicable, 
because minors, especially children, are not fully developed autonomous 
agents. They often lack the capacities needed to give informed consent. 
Second, due to their not yet fully developed capacities, minors show a much 
higher degree of vulnerability. Therefore, Paul Ramsey rigorously rejected 
the participation of minors in medical research without direct medical benefit 
for the participants as a “sanitized form of barbarism”.1(p28) However, this 
position has quite problematic implications.  
The pediatrician Harry Shirkey coined the phrase “therapeutic or 
pharmaceutical orphans” as early as in 1963 to emphasize the fact that the 
development of new medical products and procedures neglects minors.2,i 
According to Shirkey, the thalidomide catastrophe lead to stricter regulations 
that were supposed to assure the security and effectiveness of drugs 
developed for minors. However, these regulations had the effect that the 
supply of drugs for minors changed for the worse. Frequently, drugs were not 
tested on minors. Yet, testing drugs on minors is necessary to survey their 
effectiveness and security, as minors show differences in their metabolism 
that make it impossible to simply transfer the results of research performed 
on adults to minors.  
There have been no significant changes in this situation for the last 40 years. 
Minors are often treated with so-called “off-label” or “off-license” products, 
i.e. products that are not licensed for use in pediatrics or the actual area of 
application. According to Chiara Pandolfini and Maurizio Bonati, between 11 
and 80 percent of prescriptions are “off-label” or “off-license”.3 Without 
                                                 
i In this text, Shirkey refers to a conference 1963 in which he already used the term. 
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results from medical research, pediatricians must decide about the use of a 
certain drug based on their individual experience – and they must decide 
about dosage without scientifically secured data.4 Due to this situation, there 
have been efforts to increase medical research in pediatrics, both in the 
USA5,6 and the EU.ii 
Nevertheless, it is still a controversial matter whether and under which 
conditions medical research on minors is ethically justified. One approach 
that has been developed in recent years is based on the concept of “group 
benefit”. It is, however, questionable whether this concept is convincing. In 
the following, we argue that this is not the case (2). Subsequently, we present 
the concept of solidarity as an alternative approach that might be better suited 
to justify research involving minors (3, 4). In a final step, we explore the 
possibilities and limitations that come with the concept of solidarity (5). 
 
2. GROUP BENEFIT AS AN APPROACH TO JUSTIFY RESEARCH 
INVOLVING MINORS  
A classic distinction in the debate on medical research is the distinction 
between research that is of direct medical benefit for the participants on the 
one side and research that is not of such benefit on the other side. Within the 
latter class, a further distinction has been introduced in recent years, namely 
research that benefits members of the same group. Such groups are typically 
constituted according to facts such as suffering from the same disease, or 
being of the same age. This distinction gains special significance when 
applied to research involving minors. A case in point is the European Council 
who used the concept of group benefit in its Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. 
According to Article 17, research on persons who are not able to give 
informed consent to participation in research (including minors) is legitimate 
if, among other things:  
 
the research has the aim of contributing, through significant improvement in the 
scientific understanding of the individual's condition, disease or disorder, to the ultimate 
                                                 
ii For the European Union, the Regulation (EC) Nr. 1901/2006 of the European Parliament 
and Council from Dec. 12th 2006 is important to mention. 
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attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to the person concerned or to other 
persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same disease or disorder or having 
the same condition […].7 
 
Furthermore, by now the national legislations of some states incorporate the 
concept of group benefit, in particular in the context of regulations regarding 
research involving minors.iii 
Hence, the category of research that aims at benefitting a certain group has 
increasingly been established as a distinct category in the bioethical debate. 
However, its adequacy can be called into question. In particular, it is doubtful 
whether it is possible to uphold the distinction between research that is of no 
benefit to the participants (and therefore ethically problematic) and research 
that benefits the participants (either directly or indirectly, making it ethically 
acceptable) without research that benefits group members falling into the first 
category. To quote Ramsey again: „A child is not a piece of ‚childhood‘.“1(p28) 
Defenders of the concept of group benefit might argue that research involving 
minors is legitimate due to the lack of alternatives. Here, however, looms a 
different form of argument, namely a consequentialist logic of justification 
that takes the form of a balancing of goods. Several factors are taken into 
account, such as the risk that is involved in the experiment, the alternatives to 
research involving minors, and the benefit that can be expected from the 
experiment, both for the participant and for the group of which the 
participants are members. Taken this way, group benefit is just one more 
element to enter that balancing process. Yet, on closer inspection, it turns out 
that in a purely consequentialist framework the concept of group benefit is 
either morally problematic or dispensable. If it serves to weigh the benefit of 
one group more than that of another group, it appears to be morally 
problematic. Why should the benefit, say, of adults be less important than that 
of minors? If, on the other hand, it is supposed to serve to implement a 
principle of subsidiarity according to which more vulnerable research 
subjects, say minors, should only be recruited if less vulnerable participants 
                                                 
iii Council of Europe 1997: Art. 17, Nr. 2(i). The German Medicinal Products Act 
(Arzneimittelgesetz) mentions in § 41.2.2.a as a special condition for clinical trials 
involving minors, inter alia, that “the clinical trial must be of direct benefit to the group of 
patients suffering from the same disease as the person concerned”. Available at: 
http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de/englisch_amg/index.html [Accessed 31 Aug 2014]. 
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are inappropriate for methodological reasons, then it seem dispensable. It is 
reasonable to assume that such a principle can be established merely by 
balancing benefits and burdens. 
Finally, group benefit is a descriptive concept. It is a descriptive fact that other 
members of the group might benefit from the research, but not the participants 
themselves. From this, it does not immediately follow that such research is 
justified. Further argument is needed to show that the descriptive concept of 
group benefit justifies ethical judgments, such as the judgment that it is 
permissible to perform research on minors who are not fully able to give 
informed consent. 
To sum up, employing the concept of group benefit in order to justify research 
involving minors seems rather problematic. In one line of reasoning, the 
concept does not, by itself, carry significant argumentative load. Rather, it is 
a descriptive concept that can enter a consequentialist balancing process, but 
it remains unclear whether it has the normative significance that proponents 
of the concept claim. In another line of reasoning, the concept does carry 
argumentative load, but reveals significant theoretical difficulties. Hence, the 
concept of group benefit seems inadequate to solve the problem of justifying 
research on minors who are unable to give informed consent. 
Thus, the question remains how to justify research involving minors. An 
important aspect of such research is that the research subjects do not benefit 
from the research, but other members of the group of minors. This suggests 
that the justification must somehow refer to the group. The concept of group 
benefit makes such a reference, but it seems to be unsuccessful in justifying 
the research. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider another ethical concept that 
refers to a relevant group: The concept of solidarity. 
 
3. THE CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY  
Solidarity as an ethical concept has gained increasing attention in the 
bioethical literature during the last couple of years.8 Yet, it is a contested 
concept,9 insofar as different authors employ the concept in different contexts, 
without a consensus about the exact implications of the term. One can at least 
distinguish two basic understandings of solidarity, a descriptive and a 
normative one. As a descriptive concept, solidarity denominates a mutual 
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feeling of togetherness among members of a certain group. As a normative 
concept, solidarity implies moral requirements. Thus, members of solidarity 
group can demand the performance of certain acts from each other. 
In many cases, these two understandings of the term are intertwined. The 
feeling of togetherness can motivate the very actions that other members of 
the group can demand. Nevertheless, the two understandings are distinct. If a 
member of a solidarity group fails to act in the way that other members can 
demand, these other members of the group are justified in showing reactive 
attitudes that are typical for the violation of moral demands, such as anger 
and resentment.10 This often holds even if the defecting member does not 
strongly identify with the group – failing to understand oneself as a member 
of a solidarity group might already be a reason for criticism. And if it possible 
to criticize a person who does not exemplify solidarity for her lacking the 
feeling of togetherness, the two understandings of solidarity are independent 
of each other – solidarity in the one sense can occur without solidarity in the 
other sense. Furthermore, given that the reactive attitudes are typical for the 
violation of moral demands, it seems plausible to understand demands of 
solidarity as moral demands, not merely as demands that stem from some 
common interest of the group or its members. 
In what follows, we employ the normative understanding of solidarity. 
However, not only is the concept of solidarity as such a contested concept; 
the same holds for its normative understanding in particular, as there are 
different understandings of what solidarity in the normative sense implies. In 
what follows, we propose an understanding of the term that characterizes 
solidarity by four aspects of the concept that authors typically imply when 
they use the term. These aspects in combination characterize solidarity as a 
distinct ethical concept.11 
First, solidarity implies the aspect of assistance. Whenever an agent performs 
an act of solidarity, she thereby helps another person in achieving some aim. 
Thus, respecting the bodily integrity of another person normally does not 
count as an act of solidarity. The assistance might be reciprocal, but that is 
not necessarily the case. We can easily imagine cases of solidarity in which 
an agent helps others without getting a similar kind of help in return. 
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However, pointing this aspect of assistance is not sufficient to characterize 
solidarity as a distinct ethical concept. After all, altruism also manifests itself 
in acts of assistance, because an altruistic person helps others to achieve well-
being or to further their interests.12 Yet, as has been noticed by several 
authors, solidarity is not identical with altruism.8,9,13 One of the most 
important differences between solidarity and altruism is that the latter is 
universal in scope, whereas the former is restricted to certain groups. 
This leads to the second aspect of solidarity: The aspect of group-relatedness. 
It is often noticed that solidarity is practiced within specific (solidarity) 
groups:14-17 An agent who practices solidarity acts on behalf of a person that 
is member of the same (solidarity) group as the agent himself. Pointing out 
this second aspect solidarity obviously leads to the question how to 
characterize solidarity groups. Not every contingent group qualifies as a 
solidarity group; for example, a random crowd of people waiting at the bus 
stop does not. The relevant criterion cannot be a feeling of togetherness, 
because, as was mentioned above, it is possible to demand solidarity even if 
the agent does not identify with a certain group. Hence, identification with a 
group is not a constituting factor for the group. Neither is such identification 
a sufficient condition for the existence of the group. The fact that I strongly 
identify with the USA does not make me a member of the solidarity group of 
citizens of the USA, given that I am not an American citizen.  
This leads to the third important aspect of solidarity, namely the aspect of 
identity. Members of solidarity group share a feature that is (partly) 
constitutive of their identity, and solidarity groups consist of those persons 
who share this feature, even if they do not strongly identify with other 
members of the group.14,18 Thus, given that waiting for the bus does not 
constitute a person’s identity, the crowd at the bus stop does not qualify as a 
solidarity group. But what counts as an identity-constituting feature in the 
relevant sense? To repeat, mere identification is not enough. Even if I strongly 
identify with the USA, I do not share the feature of US citizenship, and thus 
I am not a part of that solidarity group. And my German citizenship might be 
part of my self-understanding and thus of my identity, even if I do not have a 
strong feeling of togetherness with fellow Germans. The features that 
constitute solidarity groups must therefore be understood as features that can 
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be ascribed to persons objectively; they describe a person in general terms (“a 
doctor”, “a father”, “a compatriot”). In a lot of cases, sharing the feature is a 
matter of choice, but this is not necessarily the case, as the example of 
citizenship shows. In this regard, the features that constitute solidarity groups 
resemble social roles as analyzed by Michael Hardimon.19 
Finally, in order to characterize solidarity as a distinct ethical concept, 
another aspect is important, namely what Rainer Forst calls “normative 
dependency”.20 Acts of solidarity are not justified simply because they 
exemplify solidarity. After all, it is possible to practice solidarity to achieve 
immoral ends – the solidarity of Nazis can help to achieve racist aims, but 
such help is not justified simply because it counts as an instance of solidarity. 
In order to generate justified demands, solidarity calls for higher-ranked 
ethical principles. In other words, solidarity is justified if and only if it serves 
the function of fulfilling ends that are ethically justified. For example, 
solidarity often aims at overcoming injustice. In such cases, the concept of 
justice defines an end, and the solidarity of the victims of the injustice is a 
means to achieve that very end. There might be cases in which other concepts 
than justice identify the relevant ends, but in any case, the relevant end of 
justified solidarity is related to the shared feature that constitutes the solidarity 
group, insofar as it is an ethical deficit that is related to that feature. For 
example, women may unite in solidarity to overcome sexism. In such a case, 
the sexism constitutes an injustice that is directly related to the shared feature 
of the members of the solidarity group (being a woman), and given that no 
single woman can overcome sexism by herself, solidarity among the members 
of the relevant solidarity group is called for. 
At this point one might object that this characterization of solidarity renders 
the concept redundant. After all, the ends that solidarity aims to achieve are 
justified by higher-ranked principles, justice being one example. But clearly, 
whenever injustice occurs, all moral agents are called to help overcoming the 
injustice. So what does the concept of solidarity add to the higher-ranked 
principles or concepts that give rise to the specific ends solidarity aims to 
achieve? Does the talk of duties of solidarity not imply a doubling of duties?  
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This is not necessarily the case. As one of us has argued elsewhere,11 
solidarity can play an important role in ethical discourse when it is conceived 
as a principle of a “moral division of labor”.21 
The idea of a moral division of labor can be illustrated by Henry Shue’s 
concept of a distribution of duties. Shue distinguishes two kinds of moral 
duties: Negative duties on the one hand and positive duties on the other.22 
Negative duties are duties “not to deprive people of what they have rights 
to”.22(p690) Positive duties are duties of assistance; they are more demanding 
than negative duties:  
 
A duty’s being positive […] means that fulfilling it will require the expenditure of some 
resource I control, like time, money, energy or emotional involvement. […] fulfilling a 
positive duty may unsurprisingly feel more burdensome than fulfilling a negative 
one.22(pp689-690) 
 
Given that duties of assistance imply more cost to the agent as compared to 
negative duties, and given that, in principle, every agent has duties of 
assistance to help every needy person, positive duties seem to pose excessive 
demands on moral agents. Therefore, they “need to be divided up and 
assigned among bearers in some reasonable way.”22(p690) Such a distribution 
of positive duties reduces their demandingness, which helps to discharge 
them in a more efficient way, as compared to a scenario in which persons try 
to discharge their duties of assistance in an uncoordinated manner. We 
understand solidarity as a principle that can be understood along these lines, 
namely as a principle that assigns universal duties to individual actors. 
Taken this way, duties of solidarity are not redundant. They are general duties 
assigned to specific persons in order to avoid the potential 
overdemandingness implied by positive duties. The relevant idea behind a 
distribution of moral duties is a principle of efficiency – if positive duties are 
distributed, this helps to discharge them more efficiently. And it is reasonable 
to take shared features as one factor that helps determining how to distribute 
these duties. Given that the moral deficits in question are related to shared 
features, members of solidarity groups can better detect cases in which help 
is needed. For example, women might better be suited to detect cases of 
everyday sexism than men. In addition, they might know better which 
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measures help to overcome the injustice. Thus, members of solidarity groups 
are in a privileged position to help, and, for that particular reason, are under 
the obligation to help. Of course, they are only the bearer of a primary 
responsibility: in cases in which the members of a solidarity group cannot 
achieve the relevant end by themselves, the duty of assistance is conveyed to 
other actors who are in a better position to do so. 
Even if solidarity implies acting on behalf of other members of a specific 
group, the concepts of solidarity and group benefit are not identical. Most 
importantly, group benefit is a descriptive concept.iv The relevant groups are 
constituted by contingent factors; however, it is not clear why some action 
should be justified simply because other members of a specific, contingent 
group benefit from its performance. Solidarity, on the other hand, is a 
normative concept that does not rely merely on descriptive factors. After all, 
not every contingent group counts as a solidarity group; and given that the 
idea of morally justified ends is part of the concept of solidarity, the problem 
of justification does not arise in the same way. After all, it is pointless to ask 
whether a person is morally justified in fulfilling her moral duties.v Of course, 
there might be cases in which the concepts are almost identical. If a person 
fulfills her duties of solidarity, she thereby benefits other members of the 
solidarity group. However, in such cases, it is the concept of solidarity that 
does the normative work of justification, not the concept of group benefit. 
Thus, the concepts might yield similar results in certain situations, but that 
does not mean that they are identical. 
 
4. THE PARTICIPATION IN MEDICAL RESEARCH – A DUTY OF 
SOLIDARITY? 
The forgoing considerations are applicable to the problem of justifying 
medical research on minors. The main line of argument runs as follows:  
It constitutes an ethically relevant deficit if persons suffer from a disease (or, 
more generally, from a health-related disadvantage) that is presently 
untreatable (or not treatable in an efficient way), but that can be expected to 
                                                 
iv We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to emphasize the distinction 
between group benefit as a descriptive concept and solidarity as a normative concept. 
v This, of course, should be read as a claim about prima facie duties – a person might not be 
justified in fulfilling her moral duties in cases in which these duties are overridden by even 
stronger duties. 
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be treated once it has been made object of medical research. The fact that one 
can reasonably expect that it will be possible to overcome the deficit generates 
an ethical requirement to help the affected persons. But the question is who 
is under the obligation of taking the necessary steps to fulfill this requirement. 
In other words: who has the primary responsibility to fulfill a certain duty that 
is, in principle, universal in scope? 
This question asks for a justified way of dividing moral labor, and this is 
where the concept of solidarity becomes relevant. According to this concept, 
considerations of efficiency play a crucial role in identifying the duty-bearers. 
In the case of minors suffering from health-related disadvantages, the 
necessary steps to provide the help consist in performing medical research in 
order to develop drugs. Here, other minors are in a privileged position to help, 
because they are the only ones who can help gathering the necessary data 
through medical research. This puts them under a specific obligation which 
can be described in terms of solidarity, since minors share a specific 
descriptive feature that forms an important part of their self-description 
(“being a minor”), and the ethically relevant deficit in question is directly 
linked to this feature. After all, they suffer from a health-related disadvantage 
for which no drugs have been developed because research has not yet been 
performed on minors, whereas there might be drugs developed for adults who 
suffer from the same disease which cannot be used on minors. Thus, the fact 
that there are no drugs available for the minors is due to their status as minors. 
By participating in medical research, minors help other members of the 
specific solidarity group (the group of minors) to overcome a deficit that is 
linked to the shared feature which constitutes the group. According to the 
solidarity approach as developed here, minors therefore have a duty of 
solidarity to participate in medical research, and this duty is moral in nature. 
This justifies such research, as being justified is implied by the concept of a 
moral duty. 
It is important to emphasize one point. Part of the rationale to develop the 
concept of a moral division of labor is that it avoids overdemandingness. 
From this, it follows that duties of solidarity must not be overdemanding 
themselves; after all, the whole point of a moral division of labor is to reduce 
demandingness, not to increase it.22 One example for overdemandingness is 
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participation in an experiment that puts a significant risk on the research 
subjects. There is no duty to participate in high-risk medical research, and the 
concept of solidarity cannot justify such research when performed on minors.  
This in turn implies another important feature of the solidarity approach as 
developed here: a sufficiently low risk for the research subjects alone does 
not carry any argumentative weight. If there is significant risk for the research 
subjects, there is no duty to participate in the research. However, it does not 
follow that a sufficiently low risk grounds a duty to participate. 
Considerations about risk serve as a limiting factor insofar as they indicate 
when a moral requirement is overdemanding and therefore ceases to be a 
duty, But they do not ground duties.vi Therefore, considerations about risk 
have a completely different status in an approach that employs the concept of 
solidarity than in an approach that invokes the strategy of a balancing of 
goods. 
A short comparison of the solidarity approach with a balancing goods 
approach help to illustrate this. We take the approach of Loretta Kopelman as 
a contrast foil to our approach.  
Kopelman distinguishes between two forms of argumentation regarding the 
justification of research on minors, the “non-consequentialist strategy” and 
the “consequentialist” or “balancing strategy”.23(p746) According to her, 
examples for the former are restrictive regulations that put great limitations 
on research with minors, such as the Nuremberg Code or the Declaration of 
Helsinki of the World Medical Association,23(pp747-748) whereas cases of the 
latter are the guidelines of the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) and the regulations in 45 CFR 46. These 
guidelines follow a consequentialist logic. The balancing of goods takes the 
minimal risk for the research subjects as well as the expectable scientific 
progress into consideration and gives greater weight to the latter. As long as 
other requirements are met (such as the assessment of an ethics committee 
                                                 
vi The same holds for considerations of efficiency. The mere fact that participating in 
medical research is an efficient way to develop drugs is not sufficient to ground a duty to 
participate in such research. Other normative considerations are necessary to ground a duty. 
The concept of solidarity is as a concept that provides such additional normative 
considerations, most importantly the considerations of identity-constituting features that 
specify which groups give rise to duties of solidarity, and the general framework of a moral 
division of labor. Hence, even if duties of solidarity rely on considerations of efficiency, the 
concept of solidarity is not identical with such considerations of efficiency. 
13 
and the representative consent of the parents), no further justification is 
needed. 
Kopelman sees the “non-consequentialist strategy” that allows research on 
minors only in cases in which the research subjects benefit directly from their 
participation as an implausible “extreme view” that should be rejected. The 
same holds for the second “extreme” position that sees considerations about 
risk that apply in cases of informed consent as applicable in cases in which 
such consent cannot be given.24(pp89-90) Furthermore, Kopelman rejects a 
“crude utilitarianism” that is directed solely on the maximization of overall 
utility, thus putting no regulations concerning risk on medical research with 
minors.23(pp757-758) Kopelman herself favors a rule-utilitarian approach, which 
acknowledges the fact that research on minors is embedded “in a context of 
deontological or non-negotiable duties”.23(p760) On this approach, the concept 
of minimal risk does not play the role of a negative indicator as it does in the 
solidarity approach but rather serves the function of a justificatory element. 
On the solidarity approach, however, considerations of sufficiently low risk 
have no such justificatory role. 
We would also like to compare the solidarity approach as developed here with 
Barry Lyons’s approach that also employs the concept of solidarity.13 This 
comparison illustrates the character of solidarity as a contested concept, as 
Lyons understands solidarity differently than we do, and thus comes to other 
conclusions. 
Lyons differs from our view in two important regards. First, he understands 
solidarity as identification of an agent with other members of a solidarity 
group; second, he rejects the idea that solidarity grounds moral duties.13(pp370-
373) Thus, Lyons understands solidarity as a concept that explains the 
motivation of minors to participate in medical research. We agree that 
identification with other members of a solidarity group can be a strong 
motivational factor. However, we maintain that it is not possible to reduce the 
ethical concept of solidarity to its motivating force. As argued above, we hold 
persons responsible when they fail to exemplify solidarity, and the according 
reactive attitudes suggest that it constitutes the violation of a moral obligation. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether an understanding of solidarity as a 
motivating factor can actually justify research involving minors, as it seems 
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to reduce the function of solidarity to an explanation of why minors might in 
fact give consent to their participation in medical research. But then the 
approach suffers from the same problems as informed consent approaches 
when applied to minors. However, the solidarity approach as developed here 
can justify research involving minors: if one can plausibly defend the claim 
that there is a moral duty to participate in such research, one thereby gives an 
ethical justification for such research. 
 
5. THREE POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
In this last part of the paper, we want to discuss possible objections against 
our view: the objection from moral agency, the objection from uncertainty, 
and the objection from enforceability. 
The objection from moral agency claims that, just as it is not possible to 
simply transfer the results from research on adults to minors, it is not possible 
to simply apply moral obligations of adults to minors. Children are not moral 
agents in the same way as adults, and this might raise doubts whether they are 
duty-bearers in a conception of a moral division of labor as sketched above. 
This objection, as important as it is, can be answered within the solidarity 
approach. We usually do not apply the same ethical standards to children that 
we apply to adults, but it does not follow that we see children as not having 
to meet any ethical requirements whatsoever. Instead, we see children as 
moral subjects that must meet certain moral requirements, which, of course, 
take the physical and psychological constitution of children into account.vii 
The objection therefore does not show that children are not duty-bearers 
within a system of a moral division of labor. It merely shows that it is 
necessary to respect certain conditions of children when allocating 
responsibilities (when making considerations about justifiable risk, for 
example). This consideration is similar to one that is presented by Harris and 
Holm in their strategy to justify research involving minors.  
Harris and Holm argue for a duty to participate in certain experiments on 
humans. In their view, the question whether such a duty exists is a too general 
question to be answered out of a specific context.25(p123) However, if the 
                                                 
vii For example, we expect children not to hit other children in their kindergarten class, and 
we expect them to share their toys with their siblings. 
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research project’s overall design is of high quality and if, furthermore, one 
can expect that the project will lead to important insight that will help other 
persons in the future, then it is possible to defend a duty to participate in that 
research. They present different arguments in order to justify such an 
obligation. First, according to them, such an obligation follows from the 
“basic moral obligation to help other people in need (or our duty of 
beneficence)”.25(p124) Second, the obligation can be derived from a “standard 
Rawlsian ‚free-rider‘ argument”: we all are beneficiaries of scientific research 
that has been done in the past, and it would be a form of unfair free-riding if 
we would use that benefit without supporting further scientific 
progress.25(p125) Furthermore, and most importantly in our context, Holm and 
Harris view minors as moral actors. They have moral rights and can make 
ethical claims, but they are also bearers of moral duties, participating in 
(certain forms of) scientific research on humans being one of them. They 
conclude:  
 
If a parent does not take this into account when making decisions for the child that parent 
displays one of the following attitudes; either the attitude that the child is not (and need 
not be) a serious moral agent at all, or the even more problematic attitude that the child 
is so deeply fallen in moral turpitude that it is not willing to discharge any of its moral 
obligations.25(p125)  
 
This shows that Holm and Harris affirm the idea that minors are under certain 
moral obligations, even if they do not refer to the notion of solidarity to 
explicate the moral obligation of minors to participate in research.  
The objection from uncertainty claims that medical research is a process that 
is performed over a long period. This means that not only might the research 
subjects not directly benefit from their participation, but that possibly no 
actual (living) persons may benefit from it. Only future persons may be the 
beneficiaries. This, actually, is a problem for a solidarity approach that rejects 
the concept of group benefit by employing the framework of normative 
individualism, according to which moral obligations are owed to actual 
persons. This problem cannot be answered in this paper, as it requires further 
investigation. What we tried to do is to provide an outline of a new strategy 
of justifying research involving minors, based on the moral obligation of 
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minors to participate in medical research. And the notion of solidarity seems 
to be better suited for this task than the concept of group benefit. Whether it 
is possible to give a convincing justification based on the notion of solidarity 
to carry out research involving minors that cannot be expected to have 
medical benefit for any living persons must remain an open question, at least 
for now. 
The objection from enforceability might be the most important one against 
our approach. It claims that even if minors have a duty of solidarity to 
participate in medical research that benefits other minors, this does not show 
that such research is justified.viii Research involving non-consenting minors 
is tantamount to enforcing a moral duty; however, not all moral duties are 
enforceable simply qua being moral duties. One might draw an analogy to 
cases of saving children from drowning: an experienced swimmer has a moral 
duty to save a child from drowning if the risk is sufficiently low, but it is 
doubtful that we are justified in pushing the swimmer into the water to force 
him make the rescue. Furthermore, it seems unjustified to perform medical 
research on non-consenting adults, even if one holds that adults have a moral 
duty to participate in such research. 
Several things can be said in response. First, we understand the stringency of 
a moral duty – and hence, its degree of enforceability – as a function of two 
factors, namely urgency and demandingness. Urgency includes the severity 
of the situation that gives rise to the duty, but also the number of other 
potential helpers and the dependency of third parties on the fulfillment of the 
duty. Demandingness consists in the potential cost to the agent. 
Demandingness comes first when deciding whether a duty is enforceable: if 
an action implies too much cost to the agent, the duty is not enforceable. If, 
in contrast, the cost is sufficiently low, the duty might be enforceable, given 
a sufficiently high urgency.  
Applied to the case of research involving minors, one might say that the cases 
of research involving non-consenting minors and research involving non-
consenting adults are different in an important respect. While at present there 
are enough volunteers to participate in research involving adults, this is not 
                                                 
viii We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this point and for providing the 
following example. 
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the case with research involving minors. This difference can explain the fact 
that we do not enforce the moral duty of adults to participate in medical 
research: given that there are enough volunteers, there is no sufficient urgency 
to enforce such a duty of non-consenting adults. However, things might be 
different should there not be enough adults volunteering in research that 
involves sufficiently low risk for the participants. In such a case, we might 
think that it is justifiable to enforce this duty, although this is a matter of 
speculation.  
However, in the case of the swimmer and the drowning child, urgency is high 
and the risk is relatively low. Hence, the question is whether the swimmer’s 
duty to save the child is enforceable. We think that the swimmer does have 
such an enforceable duty to save the drowning child, even though pushing 
him into the water might not be an appropriate way to enforce this duty. 
Intuitions might differ here, but at least according to some legal systems, the 
swimmer is liable to prosecution if he does not make an effort to save the 
child. Of course, there are legal systems that would not hold him accountable; 
we think that this difference mirrors the opposing intuitions in this case. 
Anyhow, the fact that there are some legal systems holding him accountable 
if he does not try to fulfill his duty suggests that at least it is not unreasonable 
to think that he swimmer has an enforceable duty to save the child, where 
enforcing the duty might consist in legal consequences if he fails to act 
accordingly. 
One last point is important. There seems to be a difference between “not being 
able to consent” and “withholding consent”. In fact, we might be reluctant to 
claim that we are justified in pushing the swimmer into the river because we 
think that he is withholding consent to save the child. Arguably, the autonomy 
of an agent is such an important good that enforcing moral duties of agents 
who explicitly withhold consent appears problematic in many cases. It might 
even turn out that the value of acting in accordance with one’s duties depends 
partly on the agent voluntarily fulfilling his duties, although we leave this 
point open here. The distinction between not being able to give consent and 
withholding consent suggests, however, that a duty to participate could be 
enforceable in cases in which a minor is not able to give fully informed 
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consent.ix Such cases differ from those in which a minor is explicitly 
withholding consent. For example, if a child is scared of participating in 
medical research and clearly expresses her wish not to do so, it seems less 
clear that it is justified to enforce her duty of solidarity. We might describe 
these later cases as ones in which the relative demandingness of her 
participating in the research increases to a degree that the duty is not 
enforceable any longer. 
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